Honolulu (AP) – Investigators reviewing the emergency response to last year’s wildfires that killed 102 people on Maui said in a report released Friday that there was “no evidence” that Hawaii officials had been preparing for days of intense fire weather, despite warnings for days.
That lack of planning hampered efforts to evacuate historic downtown Lahaina before it burned, the report said.
A National Weather Service forecaster emailed an “unprecedented advance warning” to fire managers on Aug. 4, 2023, Aug. Risks develop on the 8th, including severe hurricane-like winds far to the south. Report Published by the Chief Public Prosecutor.
But in the days that followed, there was no evidence that major agencies — the Hawaii Emergency Management Agency, the Maui Fire Department, Maui Police and others — had developed plans to deal with the severe wildfire danger. , stationing emergency vehicles or supplies in high-risk areas or planning potential evacuations.
“If the e-mail’s strong wording had been communicated to fire managers in other states with better-developed emergency preparedness strategies, it may have sparked attention, discussion, and operational planning,” the report said. “This is a call to action for Hawaii fire managers to prepare for the extreme weather ahead.”
Heroic efforts by firefighters and police – who risked their lives to go door-to-door to warn residents to evacuate – were undermined by a lack of planning as the deadliest US wildfire in a century destroyed thousands of buildings.
“This investigation is a wake-up call for state and county governments to learn from the past and urgently prepare for the future,” Attorney General Ann Lopez said in a statement.
Maui’s mayor said the report will help Maui respond to future disasters and save lives.
“The county is committed to an open and thorough investigation that will help us identify and implement best practices,” Mayor Richard Bissen said in a statement.
The Hawaii Emergency Management Agency did not immediately respond with comment.
Maui fire commanders discussed the forecast, but “no evidence was produced for MFD’s pre-event preparedness plans,” the report said. The police and fire departments never established a unified incident command post or action plan, and as a result, it was very difficult to know who was responding to what, where to send resources, or which evacuation routes were blocked by downed trees or power lines.
The departments share a mobile command vehicle, but the county did not provide evidence that it was used that day, the report said. Some emergency vehicles are not equipped to clear roadblocks.
Hawaii Electric Co. admitted on the morning of August 8 that its power lines caused the fire. Responding firefighters believed they had put it out. But they had limited access to the area due to steep terrain and unstable power lines, making it difficult to determine whether the fire was truly extinguished.
The fire that destroyed Lahaina that day burned in the same area. Maui County has not released a statement on the cause of the disaster.
With so many fires burning in Maui that day, police focused on routine duties such as traffic control rather than preparing for evacuations, the report said. Police and fire departments worked separately, and communications were disrupted as the wind toppled power poles and knocked out power and cell service.
Maui County and the state are using private contractors to fight the fire with water tankers and heavy equipment. But those contractors were not trained to use handheld radios, and many had to communicate with firefighters in person because of reduced cell service. Firefighters have to flag down water tankers to put out the fire. Some hydrants failed as the fire melted water lines.
Maui Fire Department policy requires backup rescue engines to be ready to respond to an emergency. But some lacked breathing apparatus and portable radios, the report said. Crews at fire stations spent valuable time locating and loading hoses, nozzles and hand tools.
Despite the warnings, chiefs from the county emergency management agency and the Maui Fire Department were off the island that day, attending conferences in Honolulu. No one appears to be responsible for strategic resource allocation, the report said.
Some of the challenges officials and residents faced were specific to Hawaii and Maui: narrow roads clogged with parked cars and private dirt roads blocked by gates.
Many older, wooden houses were separated by less than 6 feet (1.8 meters), and residents often left windows open, making it easier for fires to spread.
A 518-page report conducted by Fire Protection Research InstituteThe second part of A three-part effort Authorities to understand the tragedy and how to avoid similar disasters in the future.
The review determined that the lack of planning for wildfire risk in Hawaii, where tsunamis and hurricanes are considered the most pressing hazards, matched the long-term indifference and was one of several factors that set the stage for the disaster.
Nationally, people tend to think of Hawaii as a tropical vacation destination, less affected by fires, the report noted. When “red-flag weather” — hot, dry and windy — isn’t too different from a typical summer day, it can be hard to get excited about wildfire risk, even among residents.
“This gap between risk perception and reality appears to have contributed to relatively low investment in bushfire prevention, preparedness and response capacity over the years,” the report said.
Although the 2018 West Maui wildfire near Lahaina burned 2,000 acres (810 hectares), destroyed 21 structures and forced 600 people into shelters, the Maui Police Department’s “Natural and Man-Made Disaster Plan” did not include wildfires. The Maui Fire Department has policies in place to respond to hurricanes, but not high fire danger.
Maui County passed the law in 2022. It authorizes the fire department to require property owners to clear vegetation such as dry invasive grasses that helped fuel the Aug. 8 fire, but “the province has not produced any evidence that MFD has implemented these. Amendments in the Lahaina area,” the report said.
It called for better vegetation management and firebreaks and suggested providing alternative means of firefighting water supply for extreme events, including portable pumps that could be drawn from ponds, lagoons and the sea.
The Maui Police Department should develop safe evacuation procedures, and the Fire Department should establish operational procedures for inclement fire weather, the report said.
“Things have to change, and preparedness is where it starts,” Derek Algonis of the review board said at a news conference Friday.
